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HIGHLIGHTS 
Auctions and bidding play an important role in agricultural marketing.  A common and
noteworthy application of auctions and bidding is that of import tendering which is used for both price
determination and allocation of purchases among sellers.  In this study we develop a model to evaluate
bidding strategies and competition in Egyptian oilseeds imports. The results are particularly interesting for
understanding sellers’ bidding strategies, competition among rivals, as well as impacts of specific
variables on optimal bids and payoffs to sellers.  Although this analysis is applied to a particular set of
detailed data, the approach and implications have many applications in other bidding situations in
agricultural marketing and provide a contribution to understanding bidding strategies and competition.
This study used detailed data from tendering by Egypt for three vegetable oils (sun, cotton and
palm).  Bid functions were estimated for each supplier for each oil.  Results indicated that generally, bids
could be predicted for all bidders with a relatively high degree of confidence using simple relationships
and accessible data.  However, for each oil there appeared to be groups of bidders characterized by
differences in their bid functions. 
Taken together, bid functions have important effects on formulation of bidding strategies, on
determination of optimal bids, and on expected payoffs for bidders.  The bidding model was used to
examine the effects of these and other variables on the auction results.  Results indicated:
• The number of rivals affects the results in a predictable way.  An increase in the number of rivals
decreases optimal bids, and lowers import prices for buyers.  
• The frequency of random bidders in tenders has an important impact on the results.  In each oil
there were several bidders that did not bid in each tender, resulting in uncertainty in the number
of bidders in a particular auction.  The incidence of random bidders essentially places a lower
bound on the probability of underbidding an opponent and has the effect of increasing the
optimal bid. 
• Information among rivals about competitor bidding strategies has an  important impact on
bidding strategies and expected payoffs.  However, the magnitude depends on whether the firm
is high or low cost relative to its competition.  Results indicate that, in all cases, less information
about rivals’ behavior has the effect of raising bids.   v
ABSTRACT
Auctions and bidding play an important role in agricultural marketing.  A common and noteworthy
application of auctions and bidding is that of import tendering which is used for both price determination
and the allocation of purchases among sellers.  In this study we develop a  model to evaluate bidding
strategies and competition in Egyptian oilseeds imports. 
Information included the values of bids submitted by each supplier in each tender over the period
1990 to 1993.  Results indicate that generally bids could be predicted for all bidders with a relatively
high degree of confidence using simple relationships and accessible data.  In addition, for each oil tender
there appeared to be groups of bidders characterized by differences in their bid functions. 
The results are particularly interesting for understanding sellers’ bidding strategies, competition
among rivals, as well as impacts of specific variables on optimal bids and payoffs to sellers.  Although
this analysis is applied to a set of detailed data, the approach and implications have many applications in
other bidding situations in agricultural marketing and contributes to understanding bidding strategies and
competition.
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COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN IMPORT TENDERS:
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Introduction
Bidding competition plays an important role in many aspects of agricultural marketing.  It has
two main functions: pricing and allocation.  Transaction prices are discovered through bidding
competition and allocations are made among suppliers.  Alternatives to bidding are other forms of
pricing, including negotiation and posted prices.  Because of the efficiency of bidding competition in
fulfilling these roles, it is used in numerous commodities, products and services in general commerce and
the agricultural marketing system.  Recent examples in the commercial sector range from spectrum rights
to airwave auctions, and numerous forms of internet-based auctions.  Examples in the grain marketing
industry include bidding for forward cash contracts, import tenders, allocation of EEP subsidies, and
allocation of CCC owned stocks.  More recently, bidding has been adapted in rail service (Wilson,
Priewe, and Dahl).
One of the conventional uses of bidding competition is in tenders held by importers to determine
suppliers for grains, oilseeds and related products. Similar processes are used by domestic buyers, but
to a lesser degree of formality.  The popularity of this form of competition in import tenders is likely
related to the large volume and value of the commodity being procured, where small deviations in price
have a great impact on total cost.  Another reason is that importers have uncertainty in the value of
marketing costs, which vary through time among and across potential exporters, making a priori
selection of an individual supplier somewhat tenuous.  The final reason is that in many cases there are
institutional mechanisms prescribing a tendering process.  Examples include administration of export
programs, international financing arrangements, and internal import control mechanisms (e.g., exchange
controls) in some countries.  More recently, as part of the deregulation of imported feed grains in Japan,
the importers have adapted a tendering system (Rampton).
There are several important and interesting questions about the execution of bidding programs of
particular interest to importers and exporters in the international grain and oils trade.  These are: 1)
identification of bidding strategies used by competitors: 2) determination of optimal bids; 3) the effect of
the number of bidders on bidding competition; and 4) how information affects bidding competition
among participants.  These are all questions frequently raised by market participants and have not been
addressed in the agricultural economics literature. 
This paper develops a model of bidding competition that can be used to analyze strategies of
competitors and effects of crucial variables on auctions.  It builds upon recent advances in 2
auction theory and bidding.  The model is applied using actual data from Egyptian import tenders for
three vegetable oils (sun, cottonseed, and palm) bought on the international market.  The first section
provides a review of previous studies on bidding models.  The second section presents a statistical
analysis of the Egyptian oilseeds import tenders.  The bidding model and factors affecting optimal bids
are discussed in the third section.  Of particular interest is the effect of the number of bidders and
information on bidding strategies.  Also there are interesting differences in the competitive structure
across the three oils which are revealed in their bids.
Analytical Models of Bidding Competition
Related Literature
Cassady and Brown provide a historical overview of auction strategies and mechanisms. 
Several bibliographies [McAffee and McMillan (1987, 1996b); Engelbrecht-Wiggans; Milgrom (1985,
1987 and 1989); Rothkopf and Harstad; Wilson (1992)] review the literature on auctions and bidding
strategies.  Recent texts (including Monroe; Nagle and Holden; Lilien and Kotler; Rasmusen; Kottas and
Khumawata; and Sewall) provide some practical motivations for auctions and analytical approaches to
bidding strategies.
These mechanisms have come to be in vogue in recent years as procedures for allocating assets
in certain industries following deregulation [Shebl;  Kuttner; McMillan (1994); McAfee and McMillan
(1996a)] and have been revered in popular magazines (Norton; Economist).  Indeed, there have been
numerous recent studies that have applied  these techniques.  Examples include:  Crampton (1995);
Hendricks and Porter; Hendricks, Porter and Wilson; and McAfee and McMillan (1996a, 1996b). 
Recent examples in agriculture are summarized in Sexton (1994b, pp. 189-95) and include analyses of
EU export tenders [Borgeon and LeRoux (1996a and 1996b)], price transparency (Wilson, Dahl, and
Johnson) and the Conservation Reserve Program (Latacz-Lohmamm and Hamsvoort). An important
distinction needs to be made regarding the analytical models used to study auctions.  A strain of the
literature (e.g., Lilien and Kotler;  Engelbrecht-Wiggans; Rothkopf and Harstad) use decision models
based on the individual decision maker’s strategy, taking competitor’s strategies as given.  This is the
approach developed in this paper and follows other related research analyzing strategies of individual
players (e.g., Capel; Crampton). 
This paper models decisions of individual bidders and uses empirical data to derive expectations
of competitor bids which are incorporated into the bidding strategy.  The oilseeds auctions are distinct
when considering the strategies for formulating bids.  In the oilseeds auctions, the disparity across
bidders in terms of their geographic locations, supply conditions at origination sites, inventory, and
logistics positions leads to different cost structures that need to be accounted for in bidding strategies. 





gj(y)dy,where r ’ Oj/C;
Theoretical Model
A bidder’s objective is to maximize expected payoffs associated with alternative bids.   The
objective function is defined as: E(B) = (B - C) @ P(W) where E(B) is the expected payoff, B is the bid,
C is cost and P(W) is the probability of underbidding.  The crucial variable is P(W), the probability of
underbidding all other bidders. 
Conventional Approaches  Monroe, Lilian and Kotler, Nagle (and others) demonstrate
various approaches to deriving P(W) which ultimately are used in derivation of optimal bids.  These
include what are referred to as the winning bid approach, the average opponent approach and the
specific opponent approach.   Applicability of different approaches ultimately depends on the form and 
availability of information.  In all cases, some measure of own and/or opponents’ costs have an effect on
chosen or optimal bid values.
The approach closest to that used in this study is the specific opponent approach (Monroe;
Nagle and Holden pp. 203-204) where information exists on past bidding behavior of individual bidders.
Procedures conventionally prescribed for determining P(W) in the specific opponent approach are:  1)
assess competitor bids as a percentage of own cost on past bidding occurrences; 2) categorize these in
discrete intervals; and 3) compute the fraction of each competitor’s previous bids which exceed B.  This
is interpreted as the probability that B is less than the competitor’s bid for each bidder j, Pj (W).  This
approach is a discrete method for computing the probability of underbidding an opponent using own
costs as a reference. It can be expanded to handle multiple and random opponents (i.e., those that
randomly compete in each tender).
Lilien and Kotler (pp. 424-428) show a continuous method for determining the bid distribution. 
The procedure can be adapted to handle multiple opponents and an uncertain number of “common”
bidders. Their procedure involves:  
1) Computing the ratio rj = Oj/C, of an opponent’s past bid, Oj, to own cost, C;
2) Derive the bid distribution gj (y), where y is opponent j’s bid, to compute the probability
that j’s bid exceeds own bid:
(1)
3) With multiple opponents separate distributions are derived for each and the product of
the probabilities is used to derive the probability of winning; and
4) With uncertainty in the number of opponents, who share a common bid distribution, the
joint probability can be weighted by the number of expected bidders.1 Kennedy (pp. 208-209) explains the subtle attributes of Bayesian analysis and contrasts it with non-Bayesian
probabilities.
2 Use of bid functions has recently been discussed and used in analyzing bidding strategies in experimental auctions
in Avery and Kagel (pp. 588-589).
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 Important factors affecting bidding competition are the number of competitors, how consistently
they bid, and their bid distributions.  Analysis of past bidder behavior provides insight into who bids and
when they bid.  Analyzing past behavior also gives insight into future bid distributions of different bidders. 
The approaches described above share the common theme that competitors' bid distributions are based
on (or derived from) known and common costs.  However, the assumption of common costs across all
bidders is difficult to justify in most international agricultural markets.
Bayesian Transformation  Bayesian analysis can be used in formulating bidding strategies.1 
There are two motivations for using Bayesian statistics as an alternative for determining competitors' bid
distributions.  One is that other methods rely on own or competitors' costs, which in practice are not
observable at the time of bidding.  The other motivation is the common practice of releasing auction
results ex post.  Such information can be used to generate bid functions and probability distributions of
potential bids.
Bidders can use past bidding behavior to model the expectation of bids, E(B), and to derive the
probability of winning the tender, P(W).  Given that costs are not observed, a proxy for costs can be
used to predict bid distributions using a bid function.  Regression is used to estimate bid functions for
specific bidders.2  Of particular importance is the relationship between an opponent's prior bids, Bjt, and
a cost indicator Ct.  A bid function for a specific bidder is specified as:
Bjt = aj + bj Ct + ejt, (2)
where ejt is N(m, s2).  The bid function is used to predict bids by conditioning on a current indicator
value, Ct
*.  The expected bid, Bjt
*, for competitor j is:
Bjt
* = aj + bj Ct
* (3)
Knowing the bid function can be used to derive the expected bid and is useful for understanding
bidder behavior.  However, knowledge of the entire distribution of a competitor's bid is necessary for
determining Pj(W).  The Bayesian approach uses sample information and prior beliefs to determine the
entire distribution of the dependent variable (Press).  A bidder can use prior knowledge, a sample of
past bids and a new observation of Ct to compute the predictive density for any potential bids for bidder
j.
With a naïve prior, the difference between any potential bid and the expected bid, when
standardized, follows a t-distribution.  This relationship is derived as:5
Bjt & "j & $jC
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where Bjt is any potential bid from bidder j, Ct
* is the current cost indicator value, Cl is the subset of
cost indicator values that correspond to bids observed for bidder j,   is the standard error of the ˆ F
regression for bidder j and nj is the number of observations for bidder j.  Any potential bid can be
mapped to a t-value and then a probability.  The procedure for arriving at predictive density values is
discussed later.  The predictive densities are bidder-specific.  Hence, the sample size, standard error,
and mean cost indicator level are relative to the history of a specific bidder, not to the group of all
bidders.
The above relationship shows that the predictive density depends on three important parameters. 
The first term in the denominator,  , is constant, which implies its effect is independent of the number of ˆ F
observations.  Uncertainty of an opponent's behavior thus remains and limits the precision of the density
estimates.  The effect of the second term in the denominator becomes smaller with an increase in the
number of bids, nj.  The density is also influenced by any deviation from the mean cost indicator level. 
The predictive distribution results are similar to the derivation of confidence intervals in classical
regression due to assumptions that the disturbances are normally distributed, the prior distribution is
uniform (reflecting an ignorance of it), and the loss function is symmetric (Kennedy).
  
Derivation of optimal bids 
Bidder-specific samples are used to predict densities for different offers of rival bidders. 
Different probabilities are associated with t values, which represent the probability of the specific
opponent bidding at or below that offer level. 
Using this information, an optimal bid can be determined.  First, the probability of underbidding
each opponent, Pj (W) across a range of potential bids, is derived.  Then, the joint probability of
underbidding all opponents P(W) = P1(W) @ P2(W)... PN(W) is computed [i.e., P(W) = J(Pj(W)].
These probabilities are used to determine the optimal bid, or the bid yielding the highest expected payoff,
defined as  E(B) = (B - C) @ P(W).  In a special case where an opponent does not bid in each tender,
the probability of winning becomes Pj
f(W) =  pj  @ Pj(W) + (1- pj) where pj is the probability the
competitor bids.
The functional relationships affecting determination of the bid are illustrated in Figure 1.  Higher

































































Figure 1. Derivation of Expected Payoffs and Optimal Bid
these two functions yields the expected payoff, E(B).  The bid value associated with the maximum of that
function is the optimal bid.  Deviations from this bid would affect both the probability of winning and the
payoff, and would result in a lower E(B). An important parameter affecting bidding competition is the
number of bidders, the effect of which is elaborated in the empirical analysis.  Reduction in the number of
bidders increases P(W), and as a result, the optimal bid increases as does the E(B).  
Statistical Analysis of Competitor Bidding in Minor Oilseeds
Data Sources
A data set was developed from all tenders received by the Egyptian procurement agency
responsible for importing vegetable oils. Tenders for these oils were generally held monthly and were at
about the same time each month.  Tender terms asked for bids for one to three different vegetable oils
(sun, cottonseed and palm).  The time period for the analysis presented here covers all tenders from
January 1990 through August 1993.  Suppliers are exporting firms, some being both the processor and
exporter, others being processors’ agents.  Some suppliers bid on each of the oils being tendered, others
would offer on only one oil.  Sometimes suppliers make multiple offers at different bids (i.e., scaled3For example, one supplier made the following offers for a particular Sun oil tender: 5,000 mt @ $476.00/mt;
5,000 mt at $476.50/mt; and 10,000 mt at $477.00/mt.  
4A CBOT index of specialty oilseed prices traded for a short period of time.
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bids)3 which is a common practice in international tendering.  In our case these were each treated as
separate offers by that particular supplier. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the tenders.  There were twenty-six tenders for sun oil. 
Over the three-year period twenty different firms submitted bids in sun oil tenders. The number of firms
submitting bids, or suppliers, varied over time as does the number of bids each  submitted.  Thus, for
each tender the number of bidders and the number of total bids varied.  The number of bids exceeds the
number of bidders because of multiple bids.  For any one tender, the maximum number of separate
bidders was eleven.  There were fewer suppliers in the cottonseed and palm oil tenders.  Palm oil was
seldom tendered with only 51 bids in 7 tenders.  The average number of bidders was comparable to the
cottonseed tenders at 4, with an average of 7 bids per tender.
A time series of alternative cost indicators was used  and values derived which corresponded to
each tender date.  The indicator values included: Rotterdam prices for soybean, palm, sun, and rapeseed
oil; FOB New Orleans sun oil; CBT soybean oil and the equivalent of the FOSFA index.4  These are
taken to selectively represent the time series variability in costs of rivals that are not observable by
competitors.  Bid functions were estimated to determine the indicator that which most accurately
describes their bidding behavior.  
Table 1.  Characteristics for Egyptian Oilseed Tenders
Sun  Cottonseed Palm
Number of Tenders 26 24 7
Bidders
  Total firms submitting offers 20 12 9
  Average firms per tender 8 3 4
  Maximum per tender 11 6 7
Offers
   Total 397 145 51
   Averaged across tenders 15 6 75 Boxplots show the minimum and maximum bids as the end of the tails.  The “box”contains the second and
third quartile (50% of the observations lie within the box), with the line in the center showing the median (middle)
bid.
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Figure 2.  Sun Oil Tenders: Number of Bids and Bidders by Tender
Statistical and Graphical Analysis
Sun Oil Tenders  Figure 2 shows the number of bidders and total bids over time for the 26 sun
oil tenders.  The number of bidders and total bids fluctuate across tenders.  The fact that there were
more bids than bidders on a particular tender reflects that some bidders submitted multiple offers. 
Figure 3 shows the time-series of  bid distributions for each tender as well as the mean.  Bids on each
tender appear to be bunched in the middle with bids tailing toward the high end of offers.  Most “outlier”
bids appear to be gathered at the high end of the bids suggesting some bidders may be using a strategy
of high payoff and low probability of winning.
A boxplot of the bids across tenders is shown in Figure 4.5  The plot demonstrates the disparity
across tenders.  The size of the boxes and tail lengths change from tender to tender, indicating that
bidders as a group behave differently from tender to tender.  Tall boxes and long tails indicate a high
variance across bids (for example, compare tenders 2 and 4 to tenders 1 and 3).  Long tails relative to
box height indicates disparity across bidders (for example, tender 2).  A long tail on the bottom suggests
the winner’s curse, or underpricing the winning bid (for  example, the third from last tender).9
Figure 4.  Sun Oil Tenders: Boxplots of Bids Across Tenders


































Figure 3.  Sun Oil Tenders: Value of Bids6  The bids are plotted against the Rotterdam price on the date closest to the tender date and shown in
Figure 7.
10
Figure 5.  Sun Oil Tenders: Boxplots of Derivations of Bids From Cost Indicator Across
Tenders
Figure 5 shows a similar boxplot of deviations from the indicator value, Mjt = Bjt - Ct where Ct is the
relevant indicator cost (in this case Rotterdam Sun Oil).  There was substantial variability both in the
mean and variance of Mjt suggesting the extent to which the implied gross margins reflected in the bids
vary.  Results of a one-way ANOVA show that the deviations across tenders, Mjt, are not constant. 
Some pairs of variances tested different as well.  The means of Mjt were tested for equivalence.  The F-
statistic of 13.76 was sufficiently high to reject H0 .  These results confirm the visual evidence that the
means (and variances) of gross implicit margins are statistically not equal.  Standard deviations of the
bids across bidders for each tender shown in Figure 6, are not constant.  These suggest that uncertainty
in bids changed across tenders, confirming the utility of using auctions to discover those suppliers with
minimal costs. 
Though costs for each bidder are unobserved, the value of the commodity at a common pricing
provides a measure of the opportunity cost through time.  The relation between the bids and Ct are
shown in Figure 7.6  A simple regression line is added and shows that many of the tenders have a
majority of the distribution away from the predicted line.  The value of the winning bids relative to the
Rotterdam price are shown in Figure 8.  Only accepted winning bids are shown and are usually below
the Rotterdam price.   At a Rotterdam price of $420/mt, for example, 3 bids were accepted and all are
below that value.  Deviations are expected as bidders have different transportation costs relative to
Rotterdam, and Figure 8 also shows that Egypt normally buys at a discount to Rotterdam.11


























Figure 6. Sun Oil Tenders: Variation of Bids





























Figure 7. Sun Oil Tenders: Bids Relative to Rotterdam Sun Oil12





















Figure 8.  Sun Oil Tenders: Winning Sun Oil Bids in Relation to Rotterdam Sun Oil
Means and Variances  Mean and variance of bids submitted by each of the individual 
suppliers are shown in Table 2.  The number of bids ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 72.  There were
many sporadic bidders, and few submitted bids at each tender.  Of those suppliers with more than 20
bids, bidder Os has the greatest standard deviation of  38 and bidder Bs has the lowest at 20.  
Another way to make comparisons across bidders is to use Mjt = Bjt - Ct, where Bjt is the bid,
Ct is the cost indicator and Mjt is the deviation from the indicator price. This isolates the effect of
changes in Ct over time.  As and Rs submit high bids, with an average of $10.88 and $11.00/mt
respectively over Rotterdam.  Other bidders were well below Rotterdam, such as Ls, Qs and Ts.   The
variances of deviations from the normal spread are also shown.  Cs, Es, Ps, Qs and Rs all have relatively
high standard deviations, suggesting they are much more random in their bidding behavior; Ms and Ss,
with lower standard deviations, are more predictable.  
Cottonseed Oil Tenders  Figure 9 shows the tenders for cottonseed oil.  Compared to sun oil,
there were fewer bids per tender.  For both cottonseed and palm oils, the bids were submitted fewer in
number, submitted by few suppliers, at a lesser frequency relative to the sun oil tenders.  Means and
standard deviations of cottonseed oil bids for each supplier are shown in Table 3.  The number of bids
ranges from 1 to 61, with the vast majority made by just 3 suppliers, Ac, Cc, and Hc.13
Table 2.  Sample Statistics:  Sun Oil Bids






As 4 476 28 11 8
Bs 25 466 20 4 9
Cs 17 464 31 5 11
Ds 37 469 29 -2 10
Es 23 468 29 0 11
Fs 51 478 22 6 8
Gs 72 477 32 0 8
Hs 6 492 14 -2 7
Is 10 487 17 1 7
Js 28 504 35 2 8
Ks 8 478 24 0 10
Ls 1 439 - -11 -
Ms 4 454 1 1 3
Ns 24 486 22 2 8
Os 38 470 38 -2 8
Ps 34 482 20 3 10
Qs 6 476 13 -4 11
Rs 2 465 13 10 13
Ss 6 451 5 1 5
Ts 1 464 - -9 -
Note: Mean and variance are computed across tenders for each bidder.14
























Figure 9. Cottonseed Oil Tenders: Value of Bids
Table 3.  Sample Statistics: Cottonseed Oil Bids





Ac   13 494 36 30 24
Bc  7 518 8 14 8
Cc  61 481 35 10 11
Dc 1 534 - 37 -
Ec  2 490 20 18 3
Fc  8 502 13 12 8
Gc  5 516 29 30 15
Hc 38 465 33 2 13
Ic 2 495 1 -9 1
Jc  6 495 15 11 8
Kc  3 497 10 -1 9
Lc 3 508 21 43 38
Note: Mean and variance are computed across tenders for each bidder.7Several alternatives were available for cost indicators, C,  for deriving M.  To evaluate several regressions
were estimated.  The U.S. Gulf and Rotterdam cottonseed oil price were tested, with poor results:  R
2 < .31.  Rotterdam
sun oil price provided a better fit to the data, R
2 = .74, and is used for comparing the suppliers.   One bidder bid
relatively infrequently and was lumped with the other small bidders and considered as a random entrant with an
unknown bidding strategy
8Both the Malaysian palm and E.C. prices are correlated with the bids.  Malaysian palm was chosen as an
indicator because the individual supplier regressions fit better (shown later).  Out of nine different suppliers only Ap,
Dp, Ip, and Gp had sufficient bids for separate regressions.
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Figure 10.  Palm Oil Tenders: Value of Bids
M was derived for each bid using Rotterdam sun oil.7  Means and standard deviations are
shown in Table 3.  The lowest average bids (measured by Mjc) were submitted by Ic and Kc, but these
suppliers submitted bids only 2 and 3 times respectively.  The standard deviations for Ac, Cc, and Hc (the
firms with the most frequent offers) were greater than those for most other bidders.
Palm Oil Tenders  Figure 10 and Table 4 show comparable data for Palm oil tenders.  Results
illustrate that there were few tenders, with few firms participating in each tender.  Two firms, Gp and Ep
account for the majority of offers.8  Compared to tenders for the other oils there was much greater
variability in tender offers.  The standard deviation in M tends to increase from sun oil to cotton and
palm, likely reflecting impacts of fewer bidders as well as less liquidity in the latter two markets16
Table 4.  Sample Statistics: Palm Oil Bids





Ap  6 396 16 60 12
Bp  3 319 5 46 4
Cp  1 318 - 43 -
Dp  5 350 51 51 16
Ep  9 358 48 56 16
Fp  3 448 55 115 55
Gp 18 348 40 55 14
Hp  3 418 1 75 1
Ip  2 323 3 48 4
Note: Mean and variance are computed across tenders for each bidder.
 
Bid Functions
Procedures  Bid functions were estimated for each firm bidding on each type of oil.  The general
form was:  Bjt = aj +$j Ct + ejt.  Different cost indicators were evaluated to determine  which best
characterized bidding behavior.  In the case of sun and cottonseed oil, alternatives include the Fargo
sunseed price, Gulf sun oil price, and the FOSFA index, each of which were rejected in favor of
Rotterdam sun oil.  For palm, Malaysian palm oil was chosen as the best cost indicator.  and EU prices
(crude palm CIF Northwest Europe).  Different weighting schemes failed to improve the results.  Tests
were also conducted to allow for potential nonlinear relations in the bid functions.  Neither polynomial
(x2) or double log forms provided a better fit than the linear form (i.e. lower R2).  A semi-log form, Bjt =
aj + bj  log(Ct) + e, had a comparable fit.  However in the relevant data range the log function is almost
linear, so we simply used the linear form.  9  Only 10 bidders had sufficient observations for individual estimation. 
17
Regression Results
Results are shown in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 11 for several suppliers.9  Bid functions of
the pooled sample and major suppliers are shown for comparison purposes.  The R2s are relatively high. 
The standard error of the regression (MSE) shows the average deviation of bids from the regression line
and provides a measure of predictive accuracy.  The results indicate that Js and Os are more predicable
competitors, while Ps and Es are less predictable.
The probability of bidding, pj,  is the fraction of tenders for which the firm submitted offers.  Gs
and Fs submitted offers in 92 and 96 percent of the tenders. Other bidders had more sporadic
participation.  Specifically, Ns, Cs, Js and Bs submitted offers in less than 50% of the tenders.  Thus, the
effect of sporadic or random bidders is an important component in determining optimum bids. 
There appear to be three distinct groups of firms participating in these tenders.   These are
characterized by the values of the statistical coefficients in their bid functions.  Firms Cs, Js, Es and Os
have a high intercept, and a relatively large slope coefficient.  In comparison, Ns, Gs and Ds have small
intercepts and slopes.  Firms in the third group have very large intercepts, and 
Table 5. Bid Functions by Firm: Sun Oil
Bidder # of bids Bid Function MSE R2 Probability
of Bidding Intercept   Slope
pooled 397 6.57 0.99* 9.53 .89 1
Cs 17 91.08 1.21* 10.08 .90 .31
Js 28 60.38* 1.12* 7.35 .96 .46
Es 23 45.36 1.10* 10.61 .87 .73
Os 38 20.49 1.04* 7.50 .96 .65
Ns 24 -3.55 1.01* 8.20 .86 .26
Gs 72 5.95 0.99* 8.47 .93 .92
Ds 37 12.90 0.97* 9.97 .88 .69
Fs 51 45.21 0.92* 8.37 .86 .96
Bs 25 53.50 0.89* 8.87 .81 .46
Ps  34 83.64 0.83* 12.82 .62 .65
*Indicates significance at the 90% level.10   To test equivalence, the EES of the restricted and unrestricted models are compared.  The F-value is
given by (ESSR - ESSUR)/2 over ESSUR / (n1 + n2 - 4) where the restricted model is from a pooled sample of two
bidders and the unrestricted is the sum of individual bidders’ ESS.   For example, from Ds ’s regression the ESS is
3482.  From Fs ’s regression the ESS is 3433.  The sum of these is ESSUR = 6915.  Pooling observations and regressing
gives ESSR = 8370.  The F-value is 9.05, which exceeds the table F0.05 (2, 86), thus failing to accept the null hypothesis
that the coefficients of two suppliers are equal.    These results indicate we should treat each supplier separately.
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Figure 11.  Estimated Bid Functions for Sun Oil
slopes substantially less than one.  This latter group is also characterized by relatively poor fitting bid
functions suggesting more erratic bidding behavior.
Tests were conducted to determine if the bid functions were statistically different across rivals.10 
Test results for the 5 major bidders are shown in Table 6.  The null hypothesis is rejected in 6 of the 10
pairings.  This confirms that bidders are characterized by different bid functions.  Strategically, bidding
strategies of firms are clearly different.19
Table 6. Results of F-test of Equivalent Regression Coefficients
Supplier Ds Fs Gs Os
Fs Reject**
Gs Accept Reject**
Os Accept Reject** Accept
Ps Reject* Accept Reject*  Reject**
* 90% confidence level
** 95% confidence level
Bid functions for the cottonseed oil tenders are shown in Table 7 and Figure 12.  Compared to
the sun oil bid functions, cottonseed oil tenders have 1) generally lower values for R2; 2) higher MSEs,
and 3) more sporadic participation in tenders by individual firms.  Taken together these would suggest
there is greater uncertainty for participants in cottonseed oil tenders, which ultimately is reflected in the
bidding model.
  
Table 7.  Bid Functions by Firm: Cottonseed Oil
Bidder # of bids Bid Function MSE R2 Probability
of Bidding (  $ 
pooled 145 -45.51* 1.12* 16.53 .74
Ac  13 -256.16 1.64* 22.60 .64 .38
Gc  5 -84.37 1.23* 16.18 .77 .17
Cc  58 -79.98* 1.19* 9.73 .94 .83
F c  8 15.30 0.99* 8.84 .63 .25
Hc   37 7.42 0.99* 12.97 .87 .54
Jc 6 129.68 0.75* 8.31 .74 .25
*Indicates significance at the 90% level.20






























Figure 12.  Estimated Bid Functions for Cottonseed Oil
Like the sun oil tenders, there appear to be distinct groups of firms in the cottonseed oil tenders,
and two outliers.  Firms Gc  and Cc each  have relatively low intercepts and large slopes.  In contrast Fc
and Hc have relatively large intercepts and smaller slopes.  The two outliers are Jc  and Ac; these firms’
offers are less affected by changes in the value of the underlying commodity, and show a larger desired
margin (higher intercept).  Further, Fc and Hc are more competitive at lower values, and the others more
competitive at higher values of the cost indicator
Results for the palm oil regressions are shown in Table 8.  The results are more comparable to
the cottonseed oil tenders than the sun oil tenders.  With the exception of Ap, the probability of bidding
in the tenders is greater than for the other oils, with Gp bidding in all tenders.  An interesting feature of the
palm oil results is that two bidders, Ep and Dp, have nearly identical bid functions.  These firms behave
nearly identically, suggesting a potential for effective signaling.21
Table 8.  Bid Functions by Firm: Palm Oil
Bidder # of bids Bid Function MSE R2 Probability
of Bidding
( (  $ $
pooled 50 -57.44* 1.38* 19.08 .85 1
Ap  6 -409.04 2.40* 11.20 .60 .29
Ep  9 -70.43* 1.42* 7.18 .98 .86
Dp 5 -71.17 1.41* 8.63 .98 .71
Gp   18 -8.73 1.22* 12.85 .90 1
*Indicates significance at the 90% level.
Bidding Strategies
In this section we develop optimal bids for a prototypical bidder k.  First we show how to derive
the probability of winning against an individual rival.  Then we derive the optimal bid and expected
payoff for bidder k competing against all rivals.  Finally, sensitivity analysis is used to demonstrate effects
of critical variables on optimal bids and expected payoffs.  
Computing Competitors’ Bid Distributions
  Bid distributions were based on using estimated bid functions for specific competitors and used
to derive probability distributions.  Our prototypical bidder uses statistics (specifically, t values derived
from bid function relationships) on past behavior of rivals to formulate bidding strategies.   Statistics and
representative parameters from firm DS using the sun oil bid functions are shown in Table 9.  For
illustration we assume Ck = C = $500/mt for deriving bids for bidder k (i.e., k's cost is 500 and equal to
the cost indicator).
T-values were derived for different values of C using Equation 4.  Different t values have
probabilities associated with them, i.e., the probability of the specific opponent bidding at or below that
offer level.  Derivation of these probabilities are shown in the first two columns of Table 10.22
Table 9.  Statistical Parameters used to derive Bid
Distributions: Ds 
Statistical Parameter Value
Standard error of the regression (F) 9.97    
Degrees of freedom (n and n-2) 37, 35    
Coefficient estimates  12.899     "
$
.9685    
Mean cost ( ) C 470    
Current Ct (C*) 500    
Derived opponents' expected bid (O*) 497.17    
Table 10.  Derivation of Bid Distributions
Bids t Bayes P(W) E(B B)
485 -1.185 .88 -13.17
490 -0.699 .76 -7.55
495 -0.211 .58 -2.92
500 0.276 .39 0
505 0.763 .23 1.13
510 1.250 .11 1.10
515 1.737 .05 0.68
Probabilities in Table 10 assume only one competitor represented by Ds’s bid function and C k =
Ct = $500/mt.   The results are the probability that bidder k will win and the expected payoff associated
with different bids.  The probability of underbidding, and therefore winning, is shown.  Specifically, the
probability of bidder k underbidding competitor Ds (i.e., winning the tender) with a bid of 485 would be
.88.  The probability of winning diminishes sharply for values greater than 505.  Bid distributions for
different competitors in the sun oil tenders are shown in Figure 13.23































Figure 13.  Sun Oil Tenders: Bidding Distributions for Major Bidders
Selected observations against individual bidders in the sun oil tenders are shown in Table 11 to
allow a comparison of different bids and probabilities for different bidders.  The values shown are the
bids needed to underbid opponents with different probability levels (i.e.,  prob = .25, .5 and .75) and
were derived from the regression parameters and the Bayes transformation.  Values in the cells are the
bids necessary to underbid the specific rival.  For example, 510 is the bid needed to underbid Fs  to win
with prob = .25, if Fs were the only competitor.  Hence, bidding against only Fs with a bid of $510/mt
would result in winning 25% of time.  From this table, Fs is likely to bid highest, and Ps has the largest
spread or most uncertainty.  
Table 11.  Bid Needed to Underbid Opponents with Specified Probabilities ($/mt)
Supplier Probability of Winning 
.25 .50 .75
Optimal Bid to Win Versus Specified Opponents
Ds  504 497 490
Fs   510 503 498
Gs  505 499 493
Os  504 499 493
Ps  508 499 49024



























Figure 14.  Sun Oil Tenders: Expected Payoff of Different Bids by Major Bidders
Factors Affecting the Optimal Bid
The optimal bid for bidder k (our prototypical firm) can be derived from the above distributions
using the procedures described in Section 2.  The expected payoff functions for specific bidders are
shown in Figure 14.  The expected payoff is highest when bidding against Fs,  who tends to bid high. 
Bidding is profitable over a wide range of bids against Ps, which has the highest range of bids and the
highest standard error in the bid function.
Several critical factors affect the optimal bid.  In this section simulations are conducted to illustrate
the effect of these variables on optimal bids.
Number of Bidders   The probability of underbidding more than one opponent is the joint
probability of underbidding each opponent separately.  Thus, with additional rivals there is a smaller
probability of having the winning bid.  Figure 15 shows the different bid distributions of the major bidders
and the joint probability of underbidding up to all five bidders.  To demonstrate these effects, bidders
were added in order of likelihood of bidding, and the joint probability was computed for each set of
bidders as shown.  Even the addition of the last bidder lowers the25








































Figure 15.  Impact of Number of Bidders on Probability of Underbidding
probability of underbidding by a noticeable amount.  The expected payoffs associated with different
numbers of bidders are shown in Figure 16 and summarized in Table 12.  These were derived by
successively incorporating the bid distribution of the bidder with the next greatest frequency of bidding.    
Increasing the number of bidders from 1 to 5 (the average was 8 for sun oil) shifts the joint bid
distribution [i.e.,  P(W)] leftwards.  Figure 16 demonstrates the effect of an increase in the number of
rivals on the expected payoff and optimal bid.  Increases in the number of competitors reduces the
optimal bid and expected payoffs.  With only Bs bidding, the optimal bid was 508.  Adding CS as a rival
lowers the optimal bid to 505.  Expected payoff from the optimal bid also declines from about $2.74/mt 
to $0.73/mt.26


























Figure 16.  Impact of Number of Bidders on Optimal Bid
Table 12.  Sun Oil Tenders: Effects of Number of Bidders
Number of Bidders: Firms Included  Optimal Bid
 ($/mt)
Expected Payoff (EB B)
($/mt)
1: BS 508 2.74
2: BS,CS 505 .73
3: BS,CS, AS 504 .35
4: BS,CS,AS,OS 504 .18
5: BS,CS,AS,OS,PS 503 .11
The results illustrate that the number of bidders has a critical effect on the optimal bid and
expected payoff.  An increase in bidders reduces payoffs and optimal bids, confirming that from a buyer’s
perspective (i.e., the auctioneer) having more bidders is always better.  In this case, the added benefit
diminishes as the number of bidders approaches five.  In the case of sun oil with an average of eight
bidders, there should be more than sufficient bidders to bid away excessive profits.  However, for other27









































Figure 17.  Probability of Underbidding When Suppliers Bid in Each Tender
oils, often the number of bidders is less than four, indicating that in some tenders competition may be less
than adequate to bid away profits.  This is a major theme of the evolving literature on procurement
strategies and auctions and on the role of the number of suppliers (see Brown and McAffee and
McMillan 1987 for further discussions).
Random Bidders  Bidders do not always bid in every tender.  From a strategic perspective, the
participation of some bidders must be viewed as random.  In determining optimal bids, the probability of
underbidding a specific opponent should be weighted by the probability that an opponent will submit a
bid (as discussed in Monroe). 
Bid distributions for sun oil without adjustments for the randomness in bidding are shown in Figure
17 and Figure 18 and includes the adjustment.  Random participation in bidding essentially puts a lower
bound on the probability of underbidding an opponent at the probability that the 11See appendix for mathematical deriviation and proof of the effect of information on bidding strategies.
12See Phlips 1988; Dutta 1999; Rasmusen 1989; and  Besanko 1996 for examples of recent literature on this
topic.  Caves (1977-78) and Wilson and Dahl provide discussions of the role of information in the international grain
trade.
13Specifically, buyers may or may not release results of tenders, which bidders can use to refine estimates
about rivals bidding strategies. 
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Figure 18.  Probability of Underbidding After Adjusting for the Supplier’s Probability of
Submitting a Bid
opponent does not compete.  For Ds, this is at 0.31, so almost a third of the time you would be
underbidding Ds.  The lower end of the joint probability shifts rightward for  higher bids, but not by much. 
Before adjusting, a bid above 505 had no chance of winning; now a bid up to 510 has a slight chance of
winning.
Effects of Information on Bid Strategies11   Information about rivals’ costs and bidding
behavior has an important effect on bidding strategies.  Indeed, one of the more interesting areas of
competition relates to the role of information.12   This is of interest both from a bidder perspective (i.e., in
formulating strategies), as well as from an importer’s (or auctioneer’s) perspective (i.e., to the extent
reveal information about bids to competitors, or reduce informational uncertainties).13  Of particular
importance is the extent that information about competitor’s past bidding affects bidding strategies. 14 Dutta recently concluded that “every type of firm, and not just the more efficient ones, will find it in its
best interest to reveal information about its costs.” (Dutta, p. 338).  
29
However, as illustrated below the effect of information is highly dependent on whether the firm is a high or
low cost firm, as well as the number of competitors in the tender.14
To analyze these effects we treat MSE as the measure of information about bidders strategies
(i.e., the predictability of bid distributions).  We treat * as a scale factor, equal to 1 in the base case, and
equal to 2 in the case representing less precise information.  To evaluate the effects of informational
uncertainties we derive * * MSEi, where * = 2, to represent a bidding competition with less information
about all bidders.  Optimal bids are then derived for two levels of information denoted by *, and for each
of several numbers of bidders.  
The effect of information on the optimal bid is highly dependent on whether the bidding firm is
high or low cost.  Thus, we derive optimal bids for each of two costs: Ck  = 490 and Ck = 500 and the
cost identification for all other firms is C = $500/mt.  Results are illustrated in Table 13 and Figures 19
and 20.  Results demonstrate that increasing * increases the optimal bids in all cases.  For a low cost firm
[with a higher P(W)], the P(W) decreases but not by enough to compensate for the effect of the
increased bid.  Thus, payoff decreases for a low cost firm in a bidding situation with less information.  For
a high cost firm [low P(W)] the opposite occurs.  That is, the optimal bid increases, but the P(W) is such
that the expected payoff increases.  With N = 5 an increase in * (i.e., an increase in informational
uncertainty) lowers the expected payoff for the low cost firm but raises it for a high cost firm.  Thus, less
information amongst rivals always raises (reduces) expected payoff for high (low) cost firms. 
Table: 13.  Impacts of Informational Uncertainties on Optimal Bids: Low and High Cost
Firms
N (competitors) Cost (Ck )=490 Cost(Ck )=500
   Optimal Bid             E(B)         Optimal Bid       E(B)      
*=1 *=2  *=1   *=2 *=1 *=2 *=1 *=2    
2 498 502 3.61 3.24 505 509 .73 1.26
3 497 500 2.33 1.96 504 508 .35 .64
4 496 499 1.75 1.30 504 507 .18 .34
5 495 498 1.30 .89 503 506 .11 .2130





































Figure 19.  Impact of MSE on Probability of Underbidding

























Figure 20.  Impact of MSE on Expected Profit Ck = $50015This was suggested in Rothkopf, and is proven in Appendix II.
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Figure 21.  Impact of MSE on Expected Profit, Ck = $490   
Figure 19 shows the effect of increasing the MSE of all major opponents on the joint bid
distribution.  Moving from * = 1 to * = 2 reduces the probability of underbidding opponents, i.e., for a
given bid, the P(W) is greater if bidding against competitors that are more predictable (lower MSE).  The
effect of MSE on optimal bids and the expected payoff functions are shown in Figure 20.  Increasing the
MSE increases the expected payoff from the optimal bid.  The expected payoff functions for Ck =
$490/mt are shown in Figure 21.  In this case,  the impact of  an increased (decreased) standard error is
to actually decrease (increased)  the expected payoff from the optimal bid.15 
  
These results have important implications for bidders and importers.  Increases in the MSE for all
competitors has the effect of increasing the expected bid.  For buyers, higher payoffs to bidders and
higher optimal bids are undesirable.  Thus, buyers should adopt mechanisms to reduce the MSE (i.e., by
releasing more information on bid results) to reduce uncertainty among bidders and intensify bidder
competition.  When this occurs, a low cost firm would be favored with higher expected payoffs.  For low
cost firms, greater certainty about competitor bidding is desirable, resulting in greater expected payoffs.32
These results have interesting comparisons across the different oils.  The MSE reflects information
that is revealed in the bidding process.  For sun oil, these range from 7.5 to 12.8 and similarly for palm
oil.  However, the MSEs in the cottonseed oil bid functions were greater at 8.3 to 22.6.  This greater
information uncertainty has the effect of raising bids in cottonseed oil and yields a lesser advantage to low
cost firms.  
Summary and Conclusions
Auctions and bidding play an important role in agricultural marketing.  A common and noteworthy
application of auctions and bidding is that of import tenders, which are used for both price determination
as well as allocation of purchases among sellers.  In this study, we develop a  model to evaluate bidding
strategies and competition in Egyptian oilseeds imports.  The results are particularly interesting in
understanding sellers’ bidding strategies, competition among rivals, and impacts of specific variables on
optimal bids and payoffs to sellers.  Though this analysis is applied to a particular set of detailed data, the
approach and implications have many applications in other bidding situations in agricultural marketing and
provide a contribution to understanding bidding strategies and competition.
The conventional analytical approach to bidding strategies is enhanced in this study by using a
Bayesian predictive density.  Bid functions for different rivals were estimated relative to expected costs. 
This approach is in contrast to conventional approaches which compute the bid distributions relative to
own-costs and ignore behavioral relationships.  Bid functions are used to compute specific distributions
that can either be used as priors or updated to incorporate more bidder-specific information.  Bayesian
predictive densities also account for information in the sample that is rival-specific.  As more bids are
observed for a specific bidder (n for each bidder) the spread of the bid distribution decreases.  Hence, as
more information is accumulated, the more precise are predictions of a rival's behavior.
An additional benefit of this approach is that it accounts for different levels of costs.  There was
substantial fluctuation in the range of observed bids during even this short sample period, especially from
bidders who bid infrequently.  The predictive density accounts for differences between the current level of
cost and its mean.  Hence, if cost moves to outside of historical ranges, the predictive density would be
wider to account for that uncertainty in the sample. 
Detailed data about the tendering for three vegetable oils (sun, cotton and palm) by Egypt were
available for use in this study.  Information included the values of bids submitted by each supplier in each
tender over a period from 1990 to 1993.  Several characteristics of these tenders are of interest.  The
number of bidders varied across tenders and across the different oils.  In addition, the standard deviation
varied across bidders. This suggests that auctions would play an important role in discovering the supplier
with the lowest cost.  
Bid functions were estimated for each supplier for each oil.  Results indicated that generally, for
all bidders the bids could be predicted with a relatively high degree of confidence using simple33
relationships and public data.  However, there were several interesting characteristics from the results. 
For each oil tender there appeared to be groups of bidders characterized by differences in their bid
functions.  Of interest, in each there was one group characterized by high intercepts and lower slope
coefficients; and another group with lower intercepts and larger slopes.  These indicate that rivals have
fundamentally different bidding strategies.  Second, some bidders were highly predictable both with
regards to their bidding behavior and their participation in each tender.  In other cases firms were less
predictable.    
Taken together, these statistical characteristics have important effects on formulation of bidding
strategies, on determination of optimal bids and on expected payoffs for the bidders.  The bidding model
was used to examine the effects of these and other variables on the auction results.  Results indicated:
• The number of rivals is very important.  An increase in the number of rivals has the effect of
decreasing optimal bids, and lowering import prices for buyers.  
• The frequency of random bidders in tenders has an important impact of results.  There were
several bidders who participated sporadically resulting in uncertainty in the number of bidders.  In
general, the incidence of random bidders puts a lower bound on the probability of underbidding
an opponent and has the effect of increasing the optimal bid. 
• Information among rivals about competitor bids has an important impact on bidding strategies and
expected payoffs.  However, the effect depends on whether the firm is high or low cost.  Results
indicated that, in all cases, less information about rivals behavior has the effect of raising bids. 
However, the effect of information differs across firms.  Greater uncertainty about bidder
behavior reduces expected payoffs for low cost firms; but raises it for high cost firms.  
Several important and interesting comparisons can be made across the different oils.  The optimal
bid depends on the number of bidders, the frequency of bidding by each, and the randomness of rivals
both with respect to their participation in tenders and their behavior in previous tenders.  Tenders for the
vegetable oils differed in several important effects including the number of bidders, frequency of bidding,
and predictability about bidder behavior.  As a result, optimal bids and distribution of payoffs would vary
across oils.
There are several important implications for participants in auctions.  Buyers can benefit from
using auctions as a means of identifying low cost suppliers.  The benefits increase, resulting in lower
prices, if there is an adequate number of bidders and if they bid routinely.  They can be enhanced by
releasing information to rivals that would allow them to better depict rival behavior.  For sellers in these
types of auctions the methodologies can be used to formulate bidding strategies.  Finally, the Bayesian
approach is appealing relative to conventional approaches because it incorporates behavioral
relationships for past tenders in derivation of probabilities of winning against rivals using accessible
information.34
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Appendix:  Impacts of Information on Bidding Strategy
Changes in the knowledge of an opponents’ bid distribution influences both the behavior of other
bidders and the eventual outcomes of tenders.  Comparative statics are derived below to show how a
bidder adjusts his/her bid, given changes in an opponents’ bid distribution. 
Rothkopf has shown the profit-maximizing bid for a bidder, in a tender to buy a good, against an
opponent with a uniform bid distribution.  The bidding situation is reversed to demonstrate the selling
situation.  Begin with bidder 1, who has a cost of C and chooses a bid, b1, for an upcoming tender. 
Bidder 1 has only one opposing bidder with a uniform bid distribution from X to Y as shown below.
Given X, Y, and C, bidder 1 chooses b1, to maximize expected profit.
            
(1)
Equation (1) shows the payoff associated with b1 and the probability of underbidding the opponent.
The bid that maximizes expected profits is the derivative of Equation (1) with respect to b1:
For this to hold, the numerator in the FOC must equal 0. Solving for b1 gives:X-K X C B1 Y Y + K
E(˜ B) ’ (b1 & C)
(Y % K & b1)
(Y % K & X % K)
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(Y % 2K & X)
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(2)
which is simply the midpoint of own cost and highest opponent bid.
Substituting Equation (2) into (1) yields maximum expected profit.
which can be reduced to
(3)
Imperfect information introduces greater uncertainty about the opponent’s bids.  An increase in the
variance, by adding K to the tails of the distribution, can be represented as:
The payoff is unchanged at b1  - C, but the probability of winning changes resulting in 
(4)
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Solving for b1 gives:
(5)
This result indicates that if the variance of the opponents’ bids increases, the optimal response is to
increase the bid.  As a buyer a small variance encourages lower bids.
Substituting (5) into (4) yields the new maximum expected profit:
(6)
E(˜ B() ’
C % Y % K
2
& C Y % K &C % Y % K
2
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which can be reduced to’ (Y % K & C)2
4(Y % 2K & X)
The extent that bidder l’s expected profit changes with a change in the variance can be answered  from
two directions, using comparative statics.  Both give insight into bidding strategy/behavior.
First, find the effect of K onE(˜ B()
(7)
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If Y + 2K - X > (#)Y + K - C, then 
This simplifies to
(8)
This result indicates that increasing the variance raises (lowers) the expected profit from the
optimal bid if bidder 1's cost is above (below) the opponent’s new minimum expected bid.  In general, if
bidders submit profit-maximizing bids, then the expected profit of those bids increases if their cost is
above the lowest bid submitted.  For bidders with cost above the lowest bid submitted, they would see a
decrease in expected profit from increased variance of opponents’ bid distributions.  Buyers could
anticipate the relative changes in bidder behavior if they learned of changes in the bid distributions of
low- and high-cost bidders.
Similarly, taking the derivative of the profit equation in (4) results in:
(9)
which can be reduced to 
(b1 & C)(2b1 & X & Y)
(Y % 2K & X)2
Note that b1 - C > 0 for all bids above cost and (Y + 2K - X)2 is always > 0.
The sign of   depends on bidder l’s bid relative to the opponents’ bids. ME(˜ B)
MK(10)
These results indicate that increasing the variance raises (lowers) the profit from bidder 1's bids
that are above (below) the mean of the opponent’s bid distribution.  Hence, if the bidder submits
relatively high (low) bids (bids above the opponent’s mean), then expected profit from those bids would
increase (decrease).  This result is general and does not depend on cost assumptions or bidder behavior. 




’ 0 if b1 ’ X % Y
2
> 0 b1 > X % Y
2
< 0 b1 < X % Y
2